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Journal Of Political Economy

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In economic models, agents are instructed to echieve the goals of their organizations (corporations, government, etc). While asymetric information and contracting problems may enable agents to pursue their own agenda, incentive schemes are designed so as to align their interests with those of the organization as well as is consistent with the informational and contracting constraints.

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Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

No. Panggil

051.320-330-Han-j

Penerbit

CHICAGO : University Press., 1999

Deskripsi Fisik

425 Halaman

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Tipe Isi

Text

Tipe Media

Book

Subjek

-

Daftar isi

Informasi Lainnya

Daftar Isi

Bab 1. Advocates

Bab 2. Rigidity Of Social Systems

Bab 3. The Other Side Of The Trade-Off: The Impact Of Risk On Executive Compensation

Bab 4. Wage Rigidity In a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market

Bab 5. A Positive Theory Of Social Security Based On Repotation

Bab 6. Taxes and The Timing Of Births

Bab 7. The Defining Moment: A Review Essay

Bab 8. Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible? A Comment

Bab 9. Of Birds and Books: More On Hypothetical referenda

Bab 10. Antoin E. Murphy, John Law: Economic Theorist and Policy Maker

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